Flattening the Learning Curve: SOF as the Supported Command in the Irregular Warfare Environment by O'Hearn, David J. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2012-06
Flattening the Learning Curve: SOF as the
Supported Command in the Irregular Warfare Environment
O'Hearn, David J.












Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
FLATTENING THE LEARNING CURVE: 
SOF AS THE SUPPORTED COMMAND IN 




David J. O’Hearn 
Damon S. Robins 




 Thesis Advisor: Anna Simons 
 Second Reader: Gregory Wilson 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704–0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2012 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Flattening the Learning Curve: SOF as the 
Supported Command in the Irregular Warfare Environment 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S)  David J. O’Hearn, Damon S. Robins, Aaron C. Sessoms 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number ___N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
When the United States commits forces to a war, overseas contingency operations, or any other large-
scale military effort that centers on conflict with belligerents other than another country’s armed military 
forces, Special Operations Forces (SOF) should be the supported command. Joint doctrine allows for 
support of such a concept, but that doctrine has not always been followed in practice. Consequently, this 
thesis argues for SOF being the supported command in an irregular warfare environment. By selecting the 
force specifically trained for the task at hand, the United States will dramatically reduce the time lost on the 
“learning curve” that results from relying predominantly on General Purpose Forces (GPF) commanders in 
all combat situations. Advocating for SOF being the supported command is not an argument for SOF only, 
but rather aims for a synergistic and truly unified approach that makes the best possible use of local 
national forces, partner nations, and GPF in an irregular warfare environment.   
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Special Forces, General Purpose Forces, Integration, SOF, IJC, JFC, 
VSO, Irregular Warfare, Conventional Warfare, Joint Warfare, Joint Doctrine, Joint 
Legislation, SOCOM, Human Resource Management, Joint Policy, Us Navy SEALs, Rangers 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
89 

















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8–98) 
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
FLATTENING THE LEARNING CURVE: SOF AS THE SUPPORTED 
COMMAND IN THE IRREGULAR WARFARE ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
David J. O’Hearn 
Major, United States Army 
B.S., Northeastern State University, 1999 
 
Damon S. Robins 
Major, United States Army 
B.S., Gardner-Webb University,1996 
Aaron C. Sessoms 
Major, United States Army 




Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 









Author:  David J. O’Hearn 
   Damon S. Robins 
   Aaron C. Sessoms 
 
 
Approved by:  Dr. Anna Simons 
Thesis Advisor 
 
Greg R. Wilson 
Second Reader 
 
Dr. John Arquilla 
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
When the United States commits forces to a war, overseas contingency 
operations, or any other large-scale military effort that centers on conflict with 
belligerents other than another country’s armed military forces, Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) should be the supported command. Joint doctrine 
allows for support of such a concept, but that doctrine has not always been 
followed in practice. Consequently, this thesis argues for SOF being the 
supported command in an irregular warfare environment. By selecting the force 
specifically trained for the task at hand, the United States will dramatically reduce 
the time lost on the “learning curve” that results from relying predominantly on 
General Purpose Forces (GPF) commanders in all combat situations. Advocating 
for SOF being the supported command is not an argument for SOF only, but 
rather aims for a synergistic and truly unified approach that makes the best 
possible use of local national forces, partner nations, and GPF in an irregular 
warfare environment.   
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This thesis argues that when the United States military commits forces to 
a war, Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), or any other large-scale 
military effort that centers on conflict with belligerents other than another 
country’s armed military forces, Special Operations Forces (SOF) should be the 
supported command.  Joint doctrine states that SOF can be the supported or 
supporting command.1  This thesis will explain that in an Irregular Warfare (IW) 
environment, SOF should be the supported command. The definition of IW 
utilized in this thesis is engagement with “armed others,” or belligerents that are 
not fighting as part of a uniformed state military/militia. This determination can be 
boiled down to the simple aphorism of “choosing the right tool for the job.” 
B. EFFICIENCY 
The U.S. conventional or General Purpose Forces (GPF) are arguably the 
most professional and lethal force ever created to face other professional military 
forces, and GPF commanders should be selected to lead during a conventional 
force-on-force conflict.2 SOF will have a place in this type of warfare, but should 
serve as a supporting command to those GPF commanders.  SOF forces train 
their entire career for IW, and just as GPF are the best at force-on-force 
engagement, SOF are the best at IW engagement with armed others.  The same 
                                            
1 JP 3–05. III-10, May 2011. “Given the SOF expertise and the special operations form of 
“maneuver,” SOF may be best suited to lead U.S. forces in some operational areas. Accordingly, 
an optimal construct can be one having a SOF chain of command supported by CF and their 
enabling functions. Such a construct calls for a SOF JFC, not as a JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF, but as 
the CJTF. 
2 SOF 2030.  MAJs Robins and Sessoms participated in a Long Term Strategy study with Dr. 
Anna Simons during the summer 2011 quarter. The topic for 2011’s Long Term Strategy Seminar 
sponsored by the Office of Net Assessment was: SOF 2030 – what should decision makers be 
thinking about today in order to prepare SOF for 2030?  13 graduate students participated in the 
study (representing Naval Special Warfare, U.S. Army Special Forces, the Marine Corps, and the 
Air Force).  With 82 total deployments since 9/11, participants tackled the SOF 2030 problem 
conceptually, bringing to bear tactical and operator-level experience.  This thesis evolved from 
the Irregular Warfare portion of that study, and many ideas have been included in this document. 
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logic that leads to the determination that GPF commanders should lead in a 
force-on-force conflict also points to the determination that SOF commanders 
should lead in conflict with armed others.  SOF commanders possess the 
knowledge and training to be successful in an IW conflict without the initial 
learning curve required of a GPF commander without this training and 
experience.  Selecting a GPF commander to lead in an IW conflict is something 
akin to taking Bill Belichick away from the New England Patriots (whom he led to 
three Super Bowl wins), making him the manager of the New York Yankees, and 
then expecting him to lead them to the World Series in the same way: just 
because he is a future hall of fame football coach does not mean he has the 
knowledge or ability to manage a baseball team.  Regardless of his leadership 
abilities, Belcheck’s learning curve would be too steep. Would it not make more 
since to choose Bobby Cox, an already successful baseball coach and future 
baseball Hall of Famer, to lead the team? If sports franchises can get this right, 
then surely so could the United States military.  The endstate should always be 
to become more effective and efficient in the ways in which we choose to 
prosecute conflicts, and therefore we should be effective, efficient, and smart 
about whom we select to command our forces in these conflicts.   
C. TOP PRIORITY: DETERRENCE 
While U.S. policy makers and strategists have concluded that IW is the 
primary type of warfare we will prosecute for the foreseeable future, we still 
should not neglect our conventional prowess by converting GPF to “SOF-Like” 
IW-oriented forces, since conventional threats may once again become real, and 
should that happen, America would be left without the ability to sufficiently defend 
itself. As stated earlier, GPF are the most professional and lethal force on the 
planet.  Arguably, this is exactly why the United States is not being directly 
threatened by others via conventional warfare.  In a sense, the U.S. military has 
become a victim of its own success. Without a doubt, the Cold War and the 
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Revolution in Military Affairs have brought us to this point.3  During the Cold War, 
we found ourselves deadlocked with the USSR because both sides possessed 
the most powerful weapons on the face of the earth.  Mutually Assured 
Destruction kept both sides from using their nuclear arsenal, and a strategic 
policy known as Containment was fathered by George F. Kennan.4  Our GPF 
capabilities are a modern deterrent against other nations that may consider using 
conventional military force against the United States and, for that reason alone, 
this capability should not be allowed to atrophy.   
D. EFFECTIVENESS 
While many contend that we just need more SOF to conduct IW more 
effectively, we disagree. Again, if we increase in size much beyond where we 
currently are, we will have reached a point of diminishing returns in which SOF 
become less effective. Some believe we are already there.  In others words, we 
risk becoming watered down.  If, instead, we clearly define in doctrine when SOF 
should be the supported command, the probability of success in IW increases, 
especially since, with GPF in support, SOF would have all the manpower it 
needs. Essentially, SOF could lead an IW campaign not only with and through 
indigenous forces, but in some cases with and through GPF units advised and 
assisted by SOF to conduct large-scale IW activities as a supporting command.  
GPF could serve as IW force multipliers, as they have recently been doing in 
places like the Arghandab in Afghanistan, where SOF and GPF have 
successfully integrated to conduct Village Stability Operations (VSO) with SOF in 
the lead. 
                                            
3 The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was a concept developed by the militaries of the 
USSR, China, the U.S., the U.K., the Netherlands, etc. that led to the development and reliance 
upon technological and information advances to produce victory in conventional warfare.  Mr. 
Andrew Marshall and the Office of Net Assessment at the Pentagon led the U.S. interest in the 
RMA.  It was lauded as a success, and gained even more attention after the overwhelming, one-
sided victory by the U.S. in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. 
4 Containment theory was a U.S. policy based upon several strategies to prevent the spread 
of communism during the Cold War.  George F. Kennan is regarded as the father of containment 
theory, and most of the policy developed from his work.  The Long Telegram and the “X” articles 
were the first, and most important, of many of writings that Kennan developed on containment 
theory. 
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II. IW DOCTRINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Non-traditional ways of enforcing policy, via insurgency, Counter-Terrorism 
(CT), and Counter-Insurgency (COIN) are not new concepts.  Yet, the concerted 
effort to consolidate their application under the umbrella of IW is a relatively 
recent development.  Since the terrorist attacks in 2001, the traditional role of the 
military has shifted significantly.  Combat forces now predominately face an 
enemy that does not wear clear distinctive insignia, or carry arms openly; and 
with the exception of the initial invasion in Iraq in 2003, the United States military 
has openly faced new challenges in full spectrum warfare. Irregular warfare as 
defined by joint doctrine is “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors 
for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). ... to erode an 
adversary’s power, influence, and will,” and requires indirect and asymmetric 
approaches.5  Unfortunately, defining military problems within this context 
seemed to elude strategic decision makers prior to 2007, and likely resulted from 
poor policy administered at the national level.  Lack of success forced a 
rethinking of doctrine and standards in order to meet the demands imposed by 
the unchanging environment.   
B. POLICY 
 Over the last decade, United States policies outlined in several national 
security documents identified the need for new approaches to warfare.  In 2001, 
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a legislatively mandated review of 
strategy, first addressed a growing number of asymmetric threats that confronted 
the United States.6  However, this document did not address the need for a 
                                            
5 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, Joint Publication 1–02 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, November 8, 
2010), 175. 
6 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (2001), 
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf.  
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comprehensive joint irregular warfare doctrine in the Global War on Terror, and 
likely caused the system to rely on an outdated institutional paradigm for solving 
new complex irregular problems.7 Not until 2006, as a result of negative 
outcomes in Iraq, was the Department of Defense (DoD) forced to institutionalize 
the concept of IW in order to be successful.   
C. EXISTING IW DOCTRINE 
 In 2004, the growing insurgency in Iraq revitalized early SOF doctrine that 
addressed IW activities, such as COIN.  Taking the lead, the United States Army 
revised and published new supporting materials, to include Field Manual 3-07.22 
(Counter-Insurgency Operations), later to become FM 3-24.  Following suit, 
political and military leaders acknowledged the need for the irregular application 
of conventional and unconventional means in the Global War on Terror, and 
emphasized three specific defense activities for the military: 1) defend the 
homeland, 2) prevail in the war on terror and conduct irregular operations, and 
3) conduct and win conventional campaigns.8  The military consequently turned 
to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to draft a Joint 
Operating Concept (JOC) that would support an IW roadmap to success.9 This 
roadmap emphasized that insurgency and counterinsurgency are at the core of 
IW, and that fourteen activities fall under its umbrella.10  These activities are: 
1. Insurgency11 
2. Counter-Insurgency12 
3. Unconventional Warfare (UW)13 
                                            
7 Ibid.    
8 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (2006): 36–39, 
www.defense.gov/qdr/report/report20060203.pdf. 
9 Joint Warfighting Center, Irregular Warfare Special Study, (Norfolk: U.S. Joint Forces 
Command, August 4, 2006). 
10 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (2006). 
11 Department of Defense, Counterinsurgency Operations, Joint Publication 3-24 





6. Foreign Internal Defense (FID)16 
7. Security, Stability, Transition, Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO)17 
8. Strategic Communication (SC)18 
9. Psychological Operations (PSYOP)19 
10.  Information Operations (IO)20 
11.  Civil-Military Operations (CMO)21 
12.  Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities22 
13.  Transnational Criminal Activities23 
14.  Law Enforcement Activities 
Worth noting is that IW may require the employment of a full range of military 
capabilities, as evidenced by the preponderance of conventional forces in 
Afghanistan.24    Unfortunately, prior to 2011, established military doctrine failed 
                                            
13 Department of the Army, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, Field 
Manual 3–05.130 (Washington, DC:  Department of the Army, September 2008). 
14 Department of Defense, Joint Tactic, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, Joint 
Publication 3–07.2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 17, 1998). 
15 Department of Defense, Counterterrorism, Joint Publication 3-26 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Defense, November 13, 2009). 
16 Department of Defense, Foreign Internal Defense, Joint Publication 3-22 (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Defense, July 12, 2010). 
17 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05: Stability 
Operations, (Washington, DC; U.S. Department of Defense, September 16, 2009). 
18 Department of Defense, Joint Operational Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Defense, August 11, 2011). 
19 Department of Defense, Psychological Operations, Joint Publication 3-13.2 (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 7, 2010).  
20 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Defense Memo 12401-10: Information 
Operations, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense). 
21 Department of Defense, Civil-Military Operations, Joint Publication 3-57 (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Defense, July 8, 2008). 
22 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Intelligence, Joint Publication 2-0 (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Defense, June 22, 2007). 
23 Counterterrorism, Joint Publication 3-26. 
24 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, 175. 
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to specifically address the potential friction that could arise between SOF and 
GPF in an IW environment (IWE).  Differences in operational approaches (direct 
versus indirect) and command and control structures (tall versus flat) complicated 
the COIN effort.  Thanks to the size of their forces, conventional commanders 
dominated the military landscape.  
D. DOCTRINE REVISED 
In December 2008, Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 finally 
directed that Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and SOCOM develop a relevant 
joint IW doctrine, one that would recommend mechanisms for SOF and GPF 
interoperability and integration.25 Joint Publication (JP) 3-05 (Special Operations) 
referenced by JP 3-0 (Joint Operations) as the guide for irregular activities — 
was revised in 2011 to address some of the SOF and GPF shortfalls.  According 
to JP 3-05, in the current operational environment, “there may be cases where 
the C2 construct based on [the] preponderance of forces may not be the primary 
consideration in establishing the Joint Task Force (JTF).  In some cases, a C2 
construct based on Special Operations (SO) expertise and influence may be 
better suited to the overall conduct of an operation, with the JTF being built 
around a core SO staff.”26  The document goes on to further say that, “an 
optimal construct can be one having a SOF chain of command supported by 
conventional forces (CF) and their enabling functions, [and] such a construct 
calls for a SOF JFC…as the CJTF.”27  This thesis explores how to make such a 
construct work. 
                                            
25 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Directive 3000.07: Irregular 
Warfare, (Washington, DC; U.S. Department of Defense, December 1, 2008). 
26 Department of Defense, Special Operations, Joint Publication 3-05 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Defense, April 18, 2011), III-10. 
27 Ibid, III-10; emphasis is ours. 
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III. EXISTING LITERATURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter offers a review of the existing literature.  We draw from 
military, active duty and retired, and civilian authors, many of whom have both 
SOF and GPF backgrounds. All have either been to or served in Afghanistan or 
Iraq at various levels of command, or will do so in the near future.   
 Numerous sources discuss SOF and GPF integration in IW and the 
importance of establishing unity of command and, more importantly, unity of 
effort.  Only a small number, however, touch on identifying which should actually 
be the lead organization to command forces and establish the IW campaign 
strategy. We argue that this is the most critical factor, and getting it right will lead 
to the most effective and efficient means of prosecuting IW.   
 Most of the literature assumes that the overall COMJFC/JTF, in either a 
conventional or an irregular war, will be a conventional commander because 
conventional commanders doctrinally command more robust forces and 
historically have always assumed the COMJFC.  But, this is too myopic a take on 
how to establish a command structure.  Promoting the right commander with the 
right set of qualifications for the mission may be the better course of action.  The 
literature details how the command and control relationships must be clarified 
and staffs must be incorporated early and often. But again, no mention is made 
of who should be in charge of which mission.  This has led to dysfunction 
because, as JP 3–05 mentions, SOF may actually assume the role of COMCJTF 
and command all forces, particularly in the IWE.   
B. MILITARY OFFICER RESEARCH  
 Military officers have been discussing the topic of SOF and GPF 
integration for some time and most, if not all, would agree that successful warfare 
requires both SOF and GPF contributions. The past 10 years have demonstrated 
the importance of integration and interoperability as SOF and GPF have been 
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sharing the same battlefield and even conducting some of the same missions.  
SOF recently added a fifth “Truth” to their lexicon to highlight the critical 
importance of working with GPF to accomplish the mission; SOF Truth #5 says 
that most special operations require non-SOF assistance.  
 MAJ Jeffrey Ortoli, a U.S. Army Officer and recent graduate from the U.S. 
Army Command and General Staff College, points out that although the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) has blended the force, a “distinct cultural and operational 
rift has evolved between SOF and GPF.”28  According to Ortoli, this rift creates 
challenges during military operations when synchronization and unity of effort are 
required.29  He uses the Operation ANACONDA case study from early OEF to 
highlight the debacle of SOF and GPF integration efforts. 30 Ortoli makes a 
compelling argument for integration and interoperability at the tactical and 
operational levels for unity of effort purposes, but takes no distinct line on when 
SOF should be in the overall strategic lead. 
 Others argue that it may not be possible for the U.S. military to ever 
effectively and efficiently prosecute IW under the current organizational structure.  
Three U.S. Army officers (two SOF and one GPF), Majors Dave Painter, Mark 
Weaver, and Scott White, write in their combined thesis that the, 
“misunderstanding of IW and the improper organizational structure within the 
DoD has hindered its ability to succeed within IW environments.”31  They argue, 
using organizational design theory, that DoD has only a small number of core 
organizations even within SOF that can properly conduct activities associated 
                                            
28 Jeffrey Ortoli, Integration and Interoperability of Special Operations Forces and 
Conventional Forces in Irregular Warfare (Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General 
Staff College, December 2009), ii.   
29 Other military thesis relating to the challenges of SOF-GPF integration is MAJ Michael 
Jackson, AFSOF, Integration, and Joint Warfighting: Closing the Training Loop to Force Multiply 
and Succeed (Master’s thesis, Joint Forces Staff College, June 2008).  
30 Operation Anaconda was an early battle in OEF that sought to chase down and 
kill/capture AQ operatives to include the leader, Osama Bin Laden. 
31 Dave Painter, Mark Weaver, and Scott White, Reorganizing for Irregular Warfare 
(Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009), 5. 
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with IW.32 These include U.S. Army Special Forces, Psychological Operations 
(now Military Information Support Operations), Civil Affairs, and the Marine 
Special Operations Advisory Group. According to Painter et al., these “must be 
unified under one headquarters outside of USSOCOM and supported by 
elements from across DoD.”33   
Another thesis, written by now-LTCs Phil Mahla and Chris Riga, goes 
even further. They argue that SOF activities, including IW, are inherently 
misunderstood and sub-optimally executed by DoD. They advocate that all of 
SOF be transformed into a completely separate fifth service and given the same 
recognition and authority as the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.  
According to Mahla and Riga, this is the only way to ensure SOF is employed 
effectively and efficiently and IW activities are executed by the best 
organizational means available. 34 
 Although creating an organization from scratch or carving out existing 
ones and combining them into a separate new organization may be optimal 
courses of action, we believe this is likely to be too difficult in an already resource 
constrained environment, and would require too dramatic a cultural shift for most 
senior leaders in DoD. Since GPF are likely to want and/or feel the need to play a 
major role in the IWE, particularly if this is the kind of warfare the U.S. military is 
most likely to wage for the foreseeable future, we believe that the current 
structure can work, but with SOF as the lead command.   
COL Christopher Bado would agree. He explained over fifteen years ago 
in his 1996 thesis, “SOF is better suited to designing solutions to (IW) problems 
than GPF,” and subordinating SOF to GPF “may hinder the ability of the 
                                            
32 Regarding essential traits needed and who possesses them in order to conduct effective 
and efficient irregular warfare, see theses by Brad Burris, ARSOF Professional Military Education 
for the Future (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010) and Mike Mourouzis, 
Finding Lawrence: Finding Talent for Unconventional Warfare (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, June 2011). 
33 Painter et al., Reorganizing for Irregular Warfare, 68. 
34 Phil Mahla and Chris Riga, An Operational Concept for the Transformation of SOF into a 
Fifth Service (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2003). 
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integrated force to design and implement an appropriate solution.”35  Bado cites 
the errors made by the U.S. military during the Vietnam War when conventional-
minded leaders in command of all forces under Military Assistance Command, 
Vietnam (MACV) completely absorbed and mismanaged one of the few 
successful IW activities, which was the SOF-created and SOF-executed Civilian 
Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program.  According to Bado, MACV could not 
avoid focusing on an enemy-centric COIN strategy thanks to a conventional 
mindset.  MACV wanted SOF to go after the enemy, and was not interested in 
SOF executing population-centric pacification programs. Bado concludes in his 
thesis that careful consideration must be given to the idea of GPF supporting 
SOF, “particularly at the strategic level of integration in operations that fall 
outside the conventional warfare area of the spectrum of conflict”- Irregular 
Warfare.36 
IW, and more specifically COIN, consists of a myriad of tasks that are 
historically conducted by SOF and so do not need to be re-learned over and over 
again.  However, because GPF have assumed many SOF tasks in recent years, 
to include advising host nation forces, they have had to (re)learn many of these 
lessons the hard way.  COL Pat Roberson, Fellow at the School of Advanced 
Studies (SAMS), writes in his monograph that the U.S. Army (and the U.S. 
military for that matter) continually have to re-learn counterinsurgency principles.  
According to Roberson: 
Interest by the Army in advising is cyclic. This interest coincides 
with U.S. involvement in large-scale counterinsurgencies. Concepts 
of advisory roles are generally forgotten after counterinsurgency 
campaigns and relearned, through discovery; at the beginning of 





                                            
35 Chris Bado, Integration of Special Operations and Conventional Forces in Unconventional 
Warfare (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 1996), v. 
36 Ibid, 9. 
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have disastrous results; therefore, understanding of advisory roles, 
through education and training, should be of paramount importance 
to the U.S. Army.37 
Borrowing Roberson’s argument that the relearning of ideas, “can have 
disastrous results,” leads us to stress that choosing the right forces and right 
commanders for the job—forces and commanders that already have the capacity 
to conduct the mission and thus lead the mission—is essential. 
C. LEADING AUTHORS 
 Many books and articles have been written over the years that argue that 
the most effective and efficient organizational and command structure be utilized 
in IW.  Mark Moyar, in his thought provoking book, A Question of Command, 
argues that U.S. strategy in COIN should be neither enemy nor population-
centric, but rather leader-centric.  He contends that if the right host nation military 
and political leaders are placed in power legitimately, and possess the right non-
conventional qualities to wage a COIN war, they will be able to effectively 
develop the correct strategy for their nation.38  CPT Sean Walsh, an ARSOF 
officer, further expands on Moyar’s argument in his review of Moyar’s book for 
Special Warfare Magazine: 
While many of these attributes are common to effective leaders in 
all types of conflict, some characteristics, such as empathy, 
charisma and sociability, are unique to the counterinsurgency 
environment. Moyar writes that leaders who are successful in 
conventional conflicts sometimes lack the necessary psychological 
qualities to succeed as counterinsurgents. Moyar’s analysis calls 
into question long-held views on how to identify and develop 
qualities essential for combat leaders.39  
                                            
37 Pat Roberson, “Understanding Advisory Roles in Large Scale Counterinsurgencies,” 
(Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College, May 16, 2011), Abstract. 
38 Mark Moyar, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New 
Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2009). 
39 Sean Welsh, Book Review, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil 
War to Iraq (Special Warfare Magazine, October-December 2011, vol. 24, no. 4): 42. 
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While there are now numerous competing claims about which centricity should 
take precedence in successful COIN, we mention Moyar because he does not 
simply focus on host nation leaders, but also on those who are advising and 
assisting them.  SOF officers are specially recruited, selected, and trained for IW, 
and therefore possess the critical qualities Moyar and many others cite as keys 
to success in the IWE.40  
In her monograph Got Vision? Unity of Vision in Policy and Strategy: What It 
Is, and Why We Need It, Anna Simons argues that unconventional (or irregular) 
thinking is inherent in certain individuals and does not need to be taught.  In her 
words, individuals either have that way of thinking or they do not, and generals 
chosen to lead in the IWE must be of the unconventional mindset.  Simons 
explains: 
We need individuals who see the forest and the trees, do not have 
to be taught to think in terms of branches and sequels, and do not 
need to be prodded by doctrine (or a President) to consider what 
the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th order of effects of an action might be.41 
She contends that if the military would assess, select, reassess, and deselect to 
choose the right person to conduct IW, then the “what” or the “how” would 
become irrelevant.42  Since U.S. SOF are uniquely designed to identify such 
individuals, it seems they should be granted the lead in the IWE.  Thus far, 
however, they have not been. 
Sean Naylor describes in detail the events surrounding Operation 
ANACONDA from planning to execution, in order to show how SOF and GPF 
were at odds over how to conduct the operation and, more specifically, over who 
should command the effort.  Naylor explains that many, mostly SOF, participants, 
asked at the time why a conventional general was placed in charge of an 
                                            
40 Moyar, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq. 
41 Anna Simons, “Got Vision? Unity of Vision in Policy and Strategy: What It Is, and Why We 
Need It,” StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil (July 20, 2010), 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=998 (accessed December 
5, 2011): 1. 
42 Ibid, v. 
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irregular war; they were referring to MG Frank Hagenbeck, the 10th Mountain 
Division Commander.  According to Naylor, the rationale was that COL John 
Mulholland, who led TF Dagger, would be unable to effectively command and 
control the total forces involved. But, Naylor implies that this was more a 
consequence of conventional generals wanting to get into the fight.  After all, 
Mulholland could have been elevated to Brigadier General and left in command 
quite easily.43    
Hy Rothstein, a retired Special Forces officer, also cites Operation 
ANACONDA as a critical turning point in the Afghanistan War.  In his 2004 
doctoral thesis, A Tale of Two Wars–Why the U.S. Cannot Conduct 
Unconventional Warfare,44 Rothstein argues that if SOF had been placed in 
charge from the beginning of Operation ANACONDA, its assessment of the 
situation that the war was not conventional, but unconventional, and thereby 
required an unconventional strategy, would have led to a different campaign 
strategy and a potentially favorable outcome.  Applying Edward Luttwak’s 
attrition-maneuver warfare continuum to IW, Rothstein notes that GPF 
understand and operate best as an attrition-based organization and, “possess a 
‘DNA’ that can only produce,” a conventional solution.  Therefore, according to 
Rothstein, subordinating SOF to GPF was a critical error that kept the United 
States from developing successful campaign strategies in Afghanistan.45 
Given all of these arguments for why SOF should take the lead in the IWE, it 
is only fair to point out that others argue that even had SOF wanted to do this in 
Afghanistan, it lacks the structural capability and has an insufficient number of 
flag officers to command.  In response, we would offer that JP3–05 addresses 
                                            
43 Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (Berkley 
Publishing Group: New York, 2005). 
44 The thesis laid the foundation for Rothstein’s book, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future 
of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006). 
45 Hy Rothstein, A Tale of Two Wars – Why the U.S. Cannot Conduct Unconventional 




this, and identifies organizational constructs SOF does possess to meet this 
need.  Journalist Linda Robinson, for instance, has described how TSOC 
Commanders, who are flag officers, are able to command large forces across all 
spectrums of warfare.  Indeed, as she points out, General Stanley McChrystal 
was the first SOF flag officer placed in command of all forces, to include SOF 
and GPF, in Afghanistan. As his appointment proves, SOF flag officers are more 
than capable.46,47 
D. DOD STUDIES 
In 2008, the Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center published 
a study entitled Special Operations and Conventional Forces Integration, which 
sought to address, “insights and best practices in achieving synergy between 
conventional forces (GPF) and SOF co-located on the irregular warfare 
battlefield.” In it, retired officers GEN Gary Luck and COL Mike Findlay focus on, 
“integration considerations in those cases where a JTF is formed and SOF is 
working within the JTF’s Joint Operations Area (JOA).” The paper lays out a 
detailed analysis of the appropriate command relationships needed and 
integration insights for each of the levels of war in IW.48  
                                            
46 Linda Robinson, “Inside the ‘New’ Special Operations Forces,” USNI.org (July 2009), 
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-07/inside-new-special-operations-forces 
(accessed October 31, 2011). 
47Although had SOF been in command throughout the Afghanistan War, there is no 
guarantee that the war would have been more successful.  SOF does not have a lock on 
unconventional approaches to military problems and in times past conventional commanders and 
soldiers have been successful in the IWE. Our thesis is attempting to bridge the gap between 
SOF and GPF and not tear it down.  To reiterate, we desire to demonstrate that SOF and GPF 
are experts in their particular field identified in practice and doctrine and therefore should be 
placed in command of their particular mission sets.  We would also note that for anyone who 
thinks otherwise, General Stanley McChrystal’s resignation cannot be viewed as any sort of 
judgment on his capabilities, particularly since the Rolling Stone article was repudiated by the 
U.S. Army and DoD. 
48 Gary Luck and Mike Findlay, Insights and Best Practices: Special Operations and 
Conventional Force Integration, Focus Paper #5 (Suffolk, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, October 
2008), preface. 
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Luck and Findlay’s study seeks to foster a “one team, one fight” concept 
for SOF and GPF on the IW battlefield.49 Like them, we believe that unity of effort 
and integration must be priority number one.  However, we would submit that 
their study is lopsided because it assumes that the person at the helm of the JTF 
will always be a GPF commander who needs to learn and understand how to 
integrate and employ the SOF working within his JOA. But—what if the COMJTF 
was a SOF flag officer, and already knew how to employ SOF in IW?  Ironically, 
one need for a study such as Luck and Findlay’s grows out of the issues that 
arise when SOF are subordinated to GPF in an IWE.  Tellingly, on the 
conventional battlefield, issues between SOF and GPF are few and far between, 
because SOF generally understand they are in the supporting role.  
In the spring of 2011, the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) sponsored a 
10-week long study to engage Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) students to 
think about what SOF should look like in the year 2030.  The group included 
field-grade officers from all of the services, to include SOF and GPF.  Although 
the group did not achieve consensus on all parts of the study, officers did agree 
that SOF should lead in the IWE, given SOF selection, training, and experience.  
Citing JP 3–05, which makes clear that SOF can be a supported or supporting 
command, the SOF 2030 study argued that doctrine should identify under which 
circumstances SOF should be either the supported or supporting command.  
According to the SOF 2030 study, when the United States needs to wage 
conventional warfare, GPF should be the supported command, and when the 
United States is in an irregular fight, SOF should be the supported command.50 
 
                                            
49 Luck and Findlay, Insights and Best Practices: Special Operations and Conventional 
Force Integration, Focus Paper #5, 1. 
50 Simons et al., “SOF 2030,” Long Term Strategy Seminar conducted by the Department of 
Defense Analysis NPS (Spring 2011) and sponsored by the ONA.  
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E. CASE STUDY 
 In our quest to examine whether or not SOF should be the lead command 
in IW, we focused heavily on the work being done on a daily basis by SOF and 
GPF while executing Village Stability Operations (VSO) in Afghanistan.  
Especially fascinating is how fully integrated at all levels units are with SOF as 
the lead command.  The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-
Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) currently commands all forces in Afghanistan 
conducting VSO, to include organic SOF units and two U.S. Army infantry 
battalions. SOF, as the IW experts, are conducting VSO with and through GPF to 
accomplish the main COIN effort in Afghanistan.  This is a first.  Never before 
has a complete, battalion-sized GPF unit been fully integrated down to the squad 
level with SOF to conduct the same mission. The feedback from participants is 
quite favorable, which could well make this program a model for future SOF and 
GPF total force integration in IW and the IWE. 
 There are numerous documents available that describe the VSO program.  
Probably the most important is the CJSOTF-A manual entitled Village Stability 
Operations and Afghan Local Police Bottom-Up Counterinsurgency, commonly 
referred to as the VSO Handbook.51 Other insightful accounts include 
contributions to Special Warfare magazine, which has thus far published three 
articles summarizing the ongoing VSO effort.52 Another article worth pointing to 
is that of Dan Madden.  Madden is a Rand Corporation analyst working for 
Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan 
(CFSOCC-A); in it he provides a detailed history of the “evolution” of VSO.53 
                                            
51 COL Don Bolduc, HQ CJSOTF-A, “Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police: 
Bottom-Up Counterinsurgency,” (April 1, 2011). 
52 Special Warfare Magazine (SWM), July-September 2011, vol. 24, no. 3: 22–34. 
53 Dan Madden, Rand Corporation, CFSOCC-A CIG, “The Evolution of Precision 




In addition, there are After Action Reviews (AARs) and lessons learned 
documents composed by the units conducting VSO. We draw on all of these, 
though there are no accounts that specifically focus on the importance of total 
SOF and GPF integration in IW, and the effects that are being achieved by 
having SOF as the lead command.  Our case study in Chapter III and analysis in 
Chapter IV are intended to serve as an initial account. Important to note is that it 
is not our intent to lay out the VSO program in detail. Instead, our aim is to 
examine the integration effort between SOF and GPF to highlight how this could 
serve as a model for future IW endeavors.  For a comprehensive understanding 
of the VSO program, see the aforementioned references.54 
 
  
                                            
54 Other important references regarding VSO include (borrowed from Ty Connett and Bob 
Cassidy, “VSO: More Than Village Defense,” SWM, July-September 2011): Seth G. Jones, “It 
Takes Villages: Bringing Change From Below in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, May-June 2010; 
General David H. Petraeus, conference remarks, CFSOCC-A Village Stability/Afghan Local 
Police Conference, April 9, 2011; Frederick W. Kagan, “Defining Success in Afghanistan,” 
American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War, 2011; and Peter Bergen, 
“Why Afghanistan Is Far From Hopeless,” Time, 17 March 2011. Also essential reads are Rory 
Hanlin’s, “One Teams Approach to Village Stabililty Operations,” Small Wars Journal, September 
4, 2011, and Joseph A. L’Etoile’s, “Transforming the Conflict in Afghanistan,” Prism, September 
2011. 
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IV. OEF/VSO CASE STUDY 
A. EARLIER STRATEGY 
In the fall of 2001, Coalition forces, with the United States in the lead, went 
to Afghanistan for one primary reason: kill/capture Osama Bin Laden. The 
secondary objective was to utilize U.S. Army Special Forces working by, with, 
and through the Northern Alliance in conjunction with U.S. airpower to oust the 
Taliban regime. The objectives were clear to the U.S. military and the strategy 
adopted, in today’s vernacular, was purely enemy-centric.55  Measures of 
effectiveness (MOE) for achieving the objectives were easily definable early on 
as SOF sought to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the Al-Qa’ida (AQ) network and 
topple the Taliban regime.  However, as time went on and the United States 
shifted its focus from Afghanistan to Iraq, the Taliban insurgency re-emerged and 
began to win some popular support amongst the Afghan people.  This caused 
the Coalition, now completely led by conventional generals, to ramp up its efforts 
to find, fix, and finish the Taliban insurgents. Unfortunately, however, the 
Coalition’s efforts came at the expense of the same people the Coalition was 
supposed to free from oppression: the Afghan population.  Because the Coalition 
was unsuccessful in its primary objective, kill/capture Osama Bin Laden, one 
could argue that the Coalition never completely shifted its strategy from an 
enemy-centric focus to a population-centric focus once the environment shifted to 
a COIN fight.  Richard Daft, author of Essentials of Organizational Theory and 
Design, explains that organizations are effective to “the degree to which an 
organization realizes its goals.”56  Given the Coalition’s failure to achieve its  
 
 
                                            
55 Enemy-centric COIN focuses on attrition warfare where number of killed/captured enemy 
is the measure used to determine whether your force is winning. 
56 Richard Daft, Essentials of Organizational Theory and Design (South-Western Thomson 
Learning: New Hampshire, 2003), 24.  
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primary goal, we will take a further look into Daft’s idea of effectiveness to see 
whether it helps explain how ill-suited the Coalition’s chosen approach was for 
the COIN mission.57 
1. Goal Approach 
In any organization, it is difficult to measure effectiveness; a military 
organization is no exception.  A vast amount of research, data, and analysis has 
been devoted to trying to identify adequate, let alone optimal, MOEs over the 
past 9 years of IW in Afghanistan. Daft contends that utilizing contingency 
approaches—e.g., goal, resource-based, internal process, or stakeholder—can 
help organizations measure effectiveness by focusing on separate parts of the 
organization. According to Daft, the goal approach is, “concerned with the output 
side and whether the organization achieves its goals in terms of desired levels of 
output.”58 An enemy-centric strategy can be said to measure effectiveness using 
this approach because outputs, such as killed or captured insurgents, are 
relatively easily measured. Unfortunately, this can also trap commanders into 
always viewing these as measures of success, when in fact they may not be.  
For instance, in Vietnam, when U.S. to North Vietnamese Army and/or Vietcong 
exchange ratios reached 1:10 (excludes ARVN losses), U.S. generals saw a path 
to victory by adding hundreds of thousands of more American troops, not taking 
into account the likelihood that the enemy could and would replenish its ranks 
indefinitely. 
Prior to April 2009 the Coalition fell into just such a trap of associating high 
numbers of outputs with indications that objectives were being met or even 
exceeded when, in fact, the insurgency was gaining strength.  Interestingly, even 
non-kinetic outputs traditionally thought to bolster popular support, such as cache 
recoveries, Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAPS), and the building of 
wells, schools, and hospitals, were at times having little to no effect because 
                                            
57 Coalition is used initially to set the stage, but the unit of analysis is still CJSOTF-A and 
they are a sample of the Coalition as a whole as the actions of the CJSOTF-A nest with ISAF. 
58 Daft, Essentials of Organizational Theory and Design, 25. 
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commanders were confusing “doing stuff” with being effective.  In other words, 
while leaders thought strategic goals were being met, the “white space”59 on the 
map was increasingly being darkened by the insurgency. White space includes 
not just actual land and population, but the total human terrain within 
Afghanistan, to include the government and security forces. To be 
comprehensive we have to include the U.S. and international community as well, 
since multiple regional and supraregional players have a stake in the outcomes 
of the war.60 
Because the COIN mission is complex, and the environment is 
predominately unstable, a simple goal-oriented approach hardly seems 
appropriate. Instead, a stakeholder approach offers the better match, especially 
since a population-centric strategy requires forces to take into account all the 
various actors and better integrate, or mitigate, their different and competing 
activities.    
2. Stakeholder Approach 
According to Daft, a stakeholder “is any group within or outside an 
organization that has a stake in the organization’s performance.”61  As mentioned 
previously, there are many entities that have a vested interest in the future 





                                            
59  White space is the area surrounding a village that is inhospitable to insurgents. It has 
become the new measure of effectiveness (MOE) in the COIN campaign in Afghanistan. As 
security and stability increase in an area the “white space” expands and insurgents have difficulty 
operating and therefore are forced to relocate. 
60 For an interesting and comprehensive look into the regional politics surrounding 
Afghanistan with respect to the ongoing insurgency, read Zahid Mann’s June 2010 Naval 
Postgraduate School master’s thesis entitled, The Nature of Insurgency in Afghanistan and the 
Regional Power Politics. 
61 Daft, Essentials of Organizational Theory and Design, 27. 
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STAKEHOLDER EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA 
Afghan Population (Critical) Inhospitable to insurgents 
Afghan Government Providing essential services and economic 
prosperity 
Afghan Security Forces Providing security 
U.S. Population Support for USG/Mil objectives 
U.S. Government (includes Military) Afghans standing up for Afghans 
International Community/Regional 
Players (Pakistan, Iran, India, China 
and Russia)62 
Varies; return on investment 
Non-Governmental Organizations Low collateral damage/human rights 
Table 1.   Effectiveness Criteria 
Each stakeholder has a different set of MOEs that may either complement 
or conflict with others’ MOEs.  The strength of the stakeholder approach, 
according to Daft, is that it provides a, “broad view of effectiveness and examines 
factors in the environment as well as within the organization.”  As Daft further 
explains, “The stakeholder approach includes the community’s notion of social 
responsibility, which is not formally measured in the goal…approach.”63  To apply 
the stakeholder approach to Afghanistan would reveal that the Afghan population 
had no vested interest in the fighting between the coalition and the insurgents 
because the population had neither the will nor the power to have any effect on 
either.  Coalition forces, to include the Afghan government, were not truly 
partnering with the population.  Nor were they providing effective security or  
 
 
                                            
62 Zahid Mann, The Nature of Insurgency in Afghanistan and the Regional Power Politics. 
(Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010). 
63 Daft, Essentials of Organizational Theory and Design, 28.  Social responsibility is exactly 
what VSO is attempting to spark in the Afghan population.  The term “Afghans standing up for 
Afghans” is an unofficial motto of the VSO program. 
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governance. The bottom line is that effectiveness is complex, multidimensional, 
and must integrate all stakeholders. Or, to really cut to the chase, there can be 
no single MOE in COIN.   
B. STRATEGIC SHIFT (BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT) 
In July of 2009, GEN Stanley McChrystal assumed command of the 
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and United States Forces in 
Afghanistan (USFOR-A).64 This marked the first time a SOF flag officer assumed 
command of all forces in Afghanistan since of the war in Afghanistan began in 
2002.  Until GEN McChrystal’s appointment, GPF generals had been in charge of 
a complex and unstable irregular war that had not, to this point, been won by 
conventional means.   
GEN McChrystal arrived when the mission in Iraq was enjoying new-found 
success and was in the process of drawing down, while Afghanistan’s Taliban 
insurgency was ramping up and growing increasingly stronger. Fresh from 
successes in Iraq, the newly minted Commander of ISAF (COMISAF) brought a 
new perspective and campaign strategy to a dull and failing COIN mission. 
1. Population Versus Enemy-Centric Strategy 
GEN McChrystal’s first and most important order of business was to shift 
the focus from an enemy-centric to a population-centric mindset. The Coalition 
understood, somewhat that it was important to focus on winning the population’s 
hearts and minds, but mainly considered this a secondary objective.  The very 
narrow (short-term) direct focus was on finding and killing the enemy. There was 
no real emphasis placed on influencing and strengthening the local populace to 
stand up for themselves over the long term. A more doctrinally sound IW 
approach was therefore warranted.  Consequently, GEN McChrystal advocated 
massive restraint, acknowledging in his Congressional testimony that “it was 
                                            
64 GEN McChrystal recently relinquished command of the elite Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC) which was instrumental in waging war on Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and was 
responsible for overseeing the killing or capture of AQI’s highest leaders. He implemented a 
network style system to match that of AQI and insurgent groups. 
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more important to protect civilians than to kill insurgents.”65  Many arguments 
would erupt during the following months over whether his soft-power strategy 
was exposing ISAF and U.S. forces to undue risk.  But hardcore COIN 
supporters cheered the commander for bringing the force more in line with U.S. 
COIN doctrine.66 
2. Unity of Effort 
 In order to execute the new population-centric COIN strategy, GEN 
McChrystal needed to re-organize the force to better develop unity of command 
for the purpose of achieving unity of effort.67  Unity of effort ensures that all 
organizations involved, to include U.S. and coalition forces, strive to accomplish 
the same strategic end state. To support this initiative, GEN McChrystal created 
the ISAF Joint Command (IJC), a 3-star Headquarters (HQ) to unify control of the 
six separate Regional Commands (RCs).  In addition to the IJC, all subordinate 
RC HQs were re-designated as Division-level HQs in command of all forces in 
their respective Areas of Responsibility (AOR).68 Lastly, SOF were reorganized 
to layer and support GEN McChrystal’s overall strategic plan. No longer were 
organizations to work independently in stovepipes or in a vacuum. Instead, the 
mission was going to require mutual trust and, at times, full integration to achieve 
strategic success. 
                                            
65 Michael Cohen, “Tossing the Afghan COIN,” 
http://www.thenation.com/article/157154/tossing-afghan-coin (December 16, 2010), accessed 
September 10, 2011. 
66 FM 3–24, “COIN is an extremely complex form of warfare. At its core, COIN is a struggle 
for the population’s support. The protection, welfare, and support of the people are vital to 
success.” 	
67 FM 3–24, “Unity of command is the preferred doctrinal method for achieving unity of effort 
by military forces. Where possible, COIN leaders achieve unity of command by establishing and 
maintaining the formal commander support relationships... Unity of command should extend to all 
military forces supporting a host nation. The ultimate objective of these arrangements is for 
military forces, police, and other security forces to establish effective control while attaining a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within the society. Command and control of all U.S. 
Government organizations engaged in a COIN mission should be exercised by a single leader 
through a formal command and control system.” 
68 Bolduc, “Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police: Bottom-Up 
Counterinsurgency,” 3. 
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3. Special Operations Forces Supporting Plan  
The CFSOCC-A was established in January 2009 to better coordinate 
future SOF activities across Afghanistan prior to GEN McChrystal’s tenure and 
adoption of his population-centric strategy. CFSOCC-A would support 
COMISAF’s strategic goals and, in July 2009 begin to support the COMIJC’s 
operational goals for COIN objectives. During this timeframe, the CJSOTF-A 
became the tactical HQ to execute CFSOCC-A’s new campaign, initially referred 
to as Community Defense Initiative (CDI)/Local Defense Initiative (LDI), now 
called Village Stability Operations. VSO became the primary tool and main effort 
of COMISAF’s population-centric strategy, and still is today under current 
COMISAF GEN John Allen.69 This means, for all intents and purposes, SOF has 
become the lead element in the Afghanistan War with the CJSOTF-A at the “tip 
of the spear.”70 
C. SOF/GPF INTEGRATION IN BOTTOM-UP COIN STRATEGY 
In April 2010, SOF command authorities changed drastically for the first 
time since 2002.71 Operational Control (OPCON)72 of CFSOCC-A was changed 
from Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) to USFOR-A, the 
organization under which all USGPF forces were aligned.  This change gave the 
                                            
69 Village Stability Operations are a range of planned activities designed to stabilize a village 
and connect it to formal governance at the district and provincial levels by facilitating 
infrastructure development. Stability comes from a bottom-up, grass-roots mobilization of Afghans 
that establishes and maintains security, development, and governance in a rural environment. 
Two outward signs of stability are an absence of violence and disorder and a return to traditional 
local governance through the shura. SOF with GPF, both U.S. and Afghan, lives in and among 
the villages in order to partner with the local people and demonstrate their resolve to protect and 
provide for the populace.  
70 SOF was the primary element and therefore the lead element during the opening events 
of OEF on 7 October 2001, but as mentioned previously, became the supporting element during 
Operation Anaconda in Spring 2002. 
71 MG Frank Hagenbeck assumed command of all tactical forces in the eve of Operation 
Anaconda.  This was the first time a conventional general was given direct tactical command of 
SOF, along with GPF.  TF Dagger led by COL John Mulholland and TF Rakkasan led by COL 
Frank Wiercinski, along with OCF were now to report directly to MG Hagenbeck.   
72 Joint Publication 1.02, states that OPCON “normally provides full authority to organize 
commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control 
considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.” 
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COMUSFOR-A more authorities to put toward optimal unity of effort. Also, 
CJSOTF-A, commanded by CFSOCC-A, was put in Direct Support (DS)73 of 
COMIJC, and the subordinate Special Operations Task Forces (SOTF)/Village 
Stability Task Forces (VSTF) were put in DS to their respective RCs.74 
The aim in creating these DS relationships was for CJSOTF-A units to 
conduct a bottom-up COIN strategy nested with the RC’s plans, and thus achieve 
unity of effort.  Although a critical command relationship had to be changed for 
accountability purposes, to ensure proper command and control, resourcing, and 
employment of SOF, all SOF “retained a separate SOF chain of command 
(COC).”75 
 Once CJSOTF-A began planning and executing VSO and showing signs 
of success, DoD determined a requirement for more SOF in order to expand the 
promising COIN program to additional sites across Afghanistan.  However, 
because the CJSOTF-A troop-to-task ratio was saturated, more SOF simply did 
not exist.  COL Don Bolduc, the COMCJSOTF-A, was faced with the prospect of 
not being able to exploit VSO successes, and therefore sought a different course 
of action; he needed a plan that could provide more forces to fill the gap. Even 
additional SEAL teams and MARSOC detachments that were tasked to the 
CJSOTF-A did not begin to meet the need generated by the potential for VSO 
expansion.  Instead, COL Bolduc devised a plan to leverage the very 
experienced combat forces already available in the U.S. arsenal—namely, GPF 
in the form of U.S. Infantry.  The conventional military had been engaged in two 
                                            
73 Joint Publication 1.02, states DS is for a “mission requiring a force to support another 
specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance.” 
74 Don Bolduc, “Forecasting the Future of Afghanistan,” Special Warfare Magazine, October-
December 2011, Volume 24, Issue 4, 24.  
75 Don Bolduc, “Forecasting the Future of Afghanistan,” Special Warfare Magazine, October-
December 2011, Volume 24, Issue 4, 24. 
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COIN wars for the past 9 years and had numerous units capable of conducting 
VSO under the mentorship and advice of SOF partners.76 
In November 2010 the plan to provide increased VSO capacity was 
agreed upon at the highest levels. GEN Petraeus, the new COMISAF/USFOR-A, 
requested and was granted approval for an infantry battalion to be placed under 
OPCON of CFSOCC-A and Tactical Control (TACON)77 of CJSOTF-A.  This 
battalion was tasked and subsequently deployed in January 2011. GEN Petraeus 
then saw fit to assign an additional Infantry battalion to be deployed in July 2011.  
The original infantry battalion (1–16 IN, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division) was 
divided into platoon and squad-sized elements to be integrated with the various 
SOF teams, thus becoming a “thickening” force to increase capacity.   The 
battalion headquarters became what is known as Village Stability Coordination 
Center (VSCC)—North, and was responsible for, “coordinating national and 
provincial level development and governance resources and actors in support of 
VSO” in RC-North, where its units were operating.78  With the injection of GPF 
and this increased capacity, the CJSOTF-A by March 2011, had almost doubled 
its personnel strength from 2,900 to 5,400 and expanded from 5 to 46 VSO sites 
across Afghanistan.79 
When the second infantry battalion (1–505th IN, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 
82nd Airborne Division) deployed, it was given increased responsibility to serve as 
                                            
76 “Village Stability Operations are not a SOF-specific mission. With proper training, 
mentorship, and task organization, General Purpose Forces (GPF) are fully capable of 
conducting bottom-up COIN in Afghanistan…To maintain pace at the speed of the populace and 
insurgency, USSOF and GPF collaboration is essential for a successful bottom-up COIN 
strategy.” VSO and ALP Handbook. 
77 Joint Publication 1.02, defines TACON as having “Command authority over assigned or 
attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is 
limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers 
necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational 
control.” 
78 Madden, “The Evolution of Precision Counterinsurgency: A History of Village Stability 
Operations & the Afghan Local Police,” 8, 10. 
79 Bolduc, “Forecasting the Future of Afghanistan,” 27. 
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the Village Stability Task Force – North (VSTF-N),80 and given total 
responsibility, to include commanding all GPF and SOF conducting VSO in RC-
North.  Later, TF-1 Panther, the task forces new name, was designated Special 
Operations Task Force–North (SOTF-N), essentially because no SOTF existed in 
RC-North (in contrast to the other five RCs).  This marked another 
unprecedented act of integration.  The first unprecedented act of integration was 
the initial assignment of a GPF battalion to a JSOTF for total integration. The 
second was a GPF unit being given responsibility to oversee and function as a 
special operations unit. Also important to note is that the GPF units were not 
simply parceled out to various SOF units, but the GPF commander remained fully 
in charge of his organic forces.  It was critical to COMCJSOTF-A that the GPF 
infantry battalion commander, along with his staff, be allowed to function as an 
organic unit, albeit with SOF augmentation.81 
In order for the infantry battalion to become completely integrated and 
interoperable with SOF and able to effectively plan and execute bottom-up COIN 
within the scope of VSO, COL Bolduc first embedded SOF NCOs and officers to 
serve in key staff billets as mentors and advisors.  This included his Deputy 
Commander (DCO), senior operations NCOs, operations and logistical planners, 
and SOF communications operators.  Next, he assigned to TF-1 Panther a 
complete U.S. Army Special Forces company with additional SEAL platoons and 
combat support as the principal elements conducting VSO.  Led by a U.S. Army 
Special Forces Major, the company was organized and operated as an 
Advanced Operating Base (AOB),82 and absorbed the infantry battalion’s  
 
 
                                            
80 Madden, “The Evolution of Precision Counterinsurgency: A History of Village Stability 
Operations & the Afghan Local Police,” 8. 
81 Meeting with COL Don Bolduc, former COMCJSOTF-A, July 27, 2011, DDSO, Pentagon, 
Washington, DC. 
82 AOB is the designator given to a U.S. Army Special Forces company when deployed 
conducting operations and given additional support elements to include other SOF and GPF. 
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platoons and squads, integrating them within each of the SOF teams. The idea 
was to facilitate complete integration at all levels and maximize the chances for 
success.83 
D. VILLAGE STABILITY PLATFORM 
The element that actually executes VSO in the village is referred to as a 
Village Stability Platform (VSP), which is the level at which the GPF 
squad/platoon was mentored and advised by the SOF team.  More colloquially, 
the term Yawzai, meaning “together” in Pashto, was given to the initial SOF-GPF 
effort in RC-South: 
The Yawzai element is comprised of a task organized infantry 
squad with additional enablers designed to replicate some of the 
core VSO functions of a U.S. Special Forces split-team VSP that is 
―partnered with a USSOF team conducting VSO within the BSO’s 
[Battlespace Owners] AO. This element consists of an Infantry 
Platoon Leader, Squad Leader, HUMINT collection and analysis 
enablers, training manager, and development project managers.84 
The aim of the Yawzai elements in the village was to not only increase capacity, 
but ensure that eventually GPF would be able to work unilaterally once they were 
deemed ready by their SOF advisors. 
E. UNCERTAINTY 
 Other factors, such as a corrupt Afghan regime and/or powerful external 
actors, may in fact prevent VSO from obtaining the strategic effects so desired by 
ISAF.  The future is very uncertain, and whether or not VSO is the catalyst to 
bring about victory in Afghanistan remains unknown. Nevertheless, SOF have 
shown what is possible when they are chosen to command in the IWE, 
suggesting they should have been all along. 
                                            
83 Meeting with COL Don Bolduc, former COMCJSOTF-A, July 27, 2011, DDSO, Pentagon, 
Washington, DC. 
84 Bolduc, “Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police: Bottom-Up 
Counterinsurgency,” 75. 
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V. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
The recent formalization of an integrated SOF-GPF organizational 
structure in Afghanistan via the VSO program presupposes that adaptation of a 
new organizational design was needed to meet IWE requirements. Analyzing the 
existing structure according to basic organizational design concepts should help 
better explain this hybrid program’s effectiveness for COIN.  
A. ENVIRONMENT 
The environment, which defines an organization’s domain or boundaries, 
must be examined to understand the influence it has, specifically on an 
organization’s configuration and behavior.85  The two primary mechanisms of 
influence generated by the environment are information and resources.86  At 
every level (strategic, operational, and tactical) the environment can become 
uncertain when conducting IW operations, which consist of fourteen different but 
nonetheless overlapping activities.87  These tasks, varying in difficulty from the 
simple to the complex, require an acute understanding of all environmental 
factors in order for adaptation to succeed.   
In IW, an organization will interact with eight environmental influences, 
commonly referred to as determinates of national power: geography, population, 
resources, and economic, military, informational, psychological, and political 
factors.88 These directly impact the organization’s ability to achieve its goals.89 
                                            
85  Erik Jansen, “The Environment and its affect on Organizations,” presented at Naval 
Postgraduate School. First developed by Jay W. Lorsh in1975. 
86  Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design (New Hampshire, South-
Western Thomson Learning, 2003), 48. 
87 According to the IW Joint Operating Concept developed by the Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM) in 2007 fourteen activities were identified that comprise IW.  The core of 
these activities is insurgency and counterinsurgency.  U.S. Department of Defense, Irregular 
Warfare Joint Operating Concept: Version 1.0, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 
September 11, 2007), 10. 
88 Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept: Version 1.0, 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 11, 2007), 10. 
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The organization must monitor and transact with the external environment to 
import materials, energy, or information (e.g., inputs) for its use.90 The system 
then transforms these inputs into a product or service (e.g., output) that is 
exported back into the environment to achieve the organization’s desired 
effects.91 Forces conducting COIN in Afghanistan, for instance, require large 
quantities of information given the complex and interrelated nature of countering 
insurgents, while information is also required to assist with governance, security, 
essential services, etc.  Additionally, large quantities of resources are required to 
support the political and military objectives of both national and international 
organizations.  These inputs, to include manpower, equipment, and money, must 
then be transformed by the organization into a product that meets the needs of 
its stakeholders: the U.S. government (USG), Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), Afghan populace, and members of the 
international community.  Meanwhile, the processes by which information and 
resources are transformed are directly influenced by the strategy and vision 
provided by the organization’s leadership; these provide the starting point for the 
organization’s structure and design.   
B. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
Currently, the organization of U.S. forces in Afghanistan resembles a 
matrix-like structure, a significant shift from the functionally structured construct 
                                            
89 When the parts of an organization interact with environmental segments this is known as 
the organization’s task environment.  Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design.  
90 Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design, 48–54.  
91 Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design, 50–58.  
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that previously divided SOF and GPF forces.92  The reconfiguration of these 
relationships from functional to more matrix-like has increased the Coalition’s 
capacity to coordinate and process information, and has enabled U.S. forces to 
adapt more quickly to the uncertainty faced in this particular environment.  For 
instance, Henry Mintzberg, an organizational design specialist, would likely 
attribute the early failures in Afghanistan to the improper configuration of forces, 
which caused a breakdown in the coordination between SOF and GPF.93  
Horizontal communication in the previous command structure only existed to the 
degree that SOF and GPF elements on their own made the effort to synchronize 
strategy and objectives between themselves.  The lack of formal integration at 
every level otherwise helped prevent the force from achieving the U.S. 
government’s overall political objectives; the military’s ability to react to 
unexpected changes in the environment and overcome internal friction was 
simply too slow.   
Two elements can be used to measure stability within the environment: 
certainty and complexity, with the amount of stability directly proportional to the 
amount of certainty an environment presents.94  In other words, the more 
                                            
92 Richard Burton and Borge Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: 
Developing Theory for Application (Norwell, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 286. 
           An organization will take on one of three departmental shapes.  Functional structures 
place employees together who perform similar functions or work processes or who bring similar 
knowledge and skills to bear. These structures have well-defined departments based on 
functional specialization, dominant information flows tend to follow the hierarchy (which bears the 
burden of coordination across functions), and they have a clear distinction between line and staff.  
Divisional structures organize people according to what the organization produces (products or 
organizational outputs); divided by geography, product, or customer.  Relatively autonomous 
units manage their own business strategy, tactics and operations coordinated by a headquarters 
unit (product, customer, or geographical grouping…). Corporate headquarters allocates 
resources based on corporate strategy. Divisions may have any form or configuration.   This is 
contrary to Daft’s presentation. Organizational subunits based on a grouping of products, 
markets, or customers.  Matrix structures are multi-focused.  An organization embraces two 
structural grouping alternatives simultaneously.  Dual chain simultaneously emphasizes function 
and product. There is typically a dual hierarchy (e.g., Function and projects) with increased lateral 
communication and mutual adjustment. 
93 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?,” in Harvard Business Review, 
(Cambridge: Harvard Business School Publishing, 1981). 
94 There are two extremes within the spectrum of certainty ranging from stable to unstable.  
Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design, 50–54.  
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unstable the environment the more uncertain outcomes will be.95  Meanwhile, the 
number of interrelated problems in the task environment can range from simple 
to complex and, together, certainty and complexity provide theorists with a 
typology consisting of four quadrants (simple/stable, complex/stable, 
simple/unstable, and complex/unstable).96   Mintzberg uses this typology to 
establish which organizational configuration is best for each environment.  These 
include Machine Bureaucracy (simple/stable), Professional Bureaucracy 
(complex/stable), Simple Structure (simple/unstable), Adhocracy 
(complex/unstable), and Divisional.97  Each of these configurations further 
consists of five component parts: the strategic apex (top management), operating 
core (workers), middle line (managers), technostructure (analysts and 
designers), and the support staff (services).98  Boiling Mintzberg down and 
                                            
95 Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design, 52–54. 
96  There are two extremes within the spectrum of complexity, from simple to complex. Daft, 
Essentials of Organizational Theory and Design, 52–54. 
97 The machine bureaucracy is dominated by its technostructure and ensures that there is a 
standardized work process. Operating in a simple and stable environment, this organizational 
form relies on a centralized form of management, and given its rather large size, has difficulty 
adjusting to changes in the environment.  
The professional bureaucracy is dominated by the operating core, and relies on a 
standardization of skills for efficiency.  Operating in a complex and stable environment, 
decentralized control ensures that flexibility can be achieved in addressing a wide range of 
problems. This organizational type has less difficulty in adjusting to changes in the environment, 
but still relies on a large yet specialized operating core. 
The simple structure is dominated by the strategic apex, and relies on direct supervision by 
managers to ensure that outputs are successfully produced. Simple structures operate in simple 
and unstable environments, and their nature is inherently centralized. This organizational type is 
typically small, and can only react to limited problems, but will likely survive as the environment 
becomes more hostile. 
Adhocracy refers to an extremely flexible organization dominated by its support staff, yet 
utilizes mutual adjustment to coordinate or synchronize outputs towards meeting common goals 
and objectives. Operating in a complex and unstable environment, the adhocracy’s lack of 
formalization and decentralization enables it to adapt to significant changes in a complex 
environment. The adhocracy’s small operating core is highly educated and specialized, and can 
provide the biggest return on investment when things become uncertain. 
The divisional form is the largest of all structures.  What further differentiates it is that it 
integrates multiple independent organizations with an overall command structure. The divisional 
structure is typically formed when product lines are diversified among each independent 
organization. The focus of control for this organizational type is middle line (management), and it 
requires a standardization of outputs to ensure success. Mintzberg, Organization Design, 5–12. 
98 Mintzberg, Organization Design, 3. 
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applying takeaways from his typology to the configuration of forces in 
Afghanistan, we can see why a hybrid configuration would be key for success.99 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL FIT IN IW 
ISAF was created as an international civil and military Coalition in support 
of the GIRoA.  Commanded by a U.S. four-star general, ISAF’s structural design 
resembles that of a functional organization divided into three separate structures: 
IJC, National Training Mission (NTM), and a Special Operations Element 
(SOE).100  The IJC, commanded by a three-star general, is the main operational 
element responsible for neutralizing the insurgency, and improving governance 
for all of Afghanistan.101  The IJC closely resembles a divisional configuration 
(dominant midline and standardized outputs), and is divided into six different 
Regional Commands (North, West, South, Southwest, East, and Capital) each 
led by a two-star general.102  A divisional structure enables the IJC to adapt in an 
unstable environment thanks to its decentralized decision making ability.103  
Each regional commander is responsible for developing his own strategy to 
satisfy the requirements and expectations specific to his environment.   
As for SOF prior to 2010, the CJSOTF-A reported through a separate 
chain of command via CFSOCC-A, upward through Special Operations 
Command Central, and finally to the Central Command (CENTCOM) 
                                            
99 Mintzberg, Organization Design, 6. 
A careful analysis of two very important aspects of ISAFs organizational structure should 
make this clear: 1) the focus of control, and 2) the coordinating mechanism. 
The focus of control is what Mintzberg refers to as the one component of an organization that 
ensures success within a particular type of environment. It is dominant because it is where the 
focus of resources and effort should be placed.  In parallel, the coordinating mechanism 
determines how each of the parts communicates to achieve the organization’s overall goals for 
success. Mintzberg, Organization Design, 3–4. 
100 ISAF Web page, http://www.isaf.nato.int/news/5.html (accessed August 15, 2011). 
101 ISAF Web page, http://www.isaf.nato.int/subordinate-commands/isaf-joint-
command/index.php (accessed August 15, 2011). 
102 ISAF Web page, http://www.isaf.nato.int/subordinate-commands/isaf-joint-
command/index.php (accessed August 15, 2011). 
103 Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design, 106–135. 
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Commander.  The separation between SOF and GPF caused friction, which in 
turn prevented the achievement of ISAF’s political objectives.  Yet, when both 
SOF and GPF were forced to adopt the same population-centric strategy under 
GEN McChrystal’s direction, they had little choice but to strengthen their 
coordinating mechanisms and to synchronize their efforts.  A new organizational 
structure emerged that placed CFSOCC-A and its subordinate commands under 
OPCON of ISAF.  This helped to significantly reduce the problems created by 
separate stovepipes, and placed the CJSOTF-A squarely within ISAF’s 
organizational boundaries.   
When analyzed structurally, CJSOTF-A displays the characteristics of a 
divisional organization.  Like the IJC, CJSOTF-A has regionally oriented task 
forces in direct support of the regional commands.  Therefore, the dominant part 
of this organization is, again, the mid-line, which requires a standardization of 
outputs to ensure ISAF goals and objectives are met. CJSOTF-A maintains six 
subordinate commands with two lines of effort: FID and VSO.  VSO, though not a 
new concept, has only been recently applied in Afghanistan, and is one of the 
approaches that has produced the outcomes (increased security and effective 
governance) that meet stakeholders’ expectations.  The outputs sought can be 
seen in what is known as “white space,” whose expansion has required an 
increase in horizontal communication to ensure that all efforts are mutually 
supporting of the organization’s overall goals (of more white space). 
In all organizations, the degree of workflow between parts is determined 
by the extent to which departments depend on each other for resources and 
materials to accomplish their tasks.104  The degree of connectedness, referred to 
as interdependence, can be broken down into a number of types.105  Overall, 
ISAF requires a pooled interdependence to meet its objectives.  Workflow is not 
                                            
104 James Thompson, Organizations in Action, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), 51-82. 
105 Types of interdependence include pooled, reciprocal, and sequential. Daft, Organization 
Theory and Design, 174-190. 
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required between units; it is instead sufficient for organizations to act 
independently on behalf of a common goal.106  However, rules must exist to 
ensure that standardized outputs are achieved.  Conversely, VSO depends on 
reciprocal interdependence, which requires a mutually supporting effort to 
accomplish goals and objectives.107 The IWE demands this kind of 
interdependence since the output of one department directly influences the 
inputs of another in a reciprocal fashion.108  Thanks to SOF’s hybrid concept in 
VSO, a high degree of interconnectedness and coordination has resulted in a 
strategy that ensures a unity of effort, prompting further expansion.  
D. STRATEGY 
Prevailing organizational design theory leads to the determination that 
SOF Commanders and SOF units should be the lead in the IWE. However, at 
times in the IWE the force ratio required may be larger than the existing pool of 
SOF forces, and may lead policy makers to ask for more SOF. According to SOF 
Truth #3, “SOF cannot be mass-produced.”109  This is yet another argument for 
effectively integrating SOF and GPF capabilities to meet the challenges 
presented by a growing irregular environment.  As has been written, “strategy is 
a plan for interacting with the competitive environment to achieve organizational 
goals.”110  However, adopting the wrong strategy can often produce undesired or 
even opposite outcomes, such as a larger insurgency.  The transformation 
process in Afghanistan requires one of two military strategies: the direct or the 
                                            
106 Daft , Organization Theory and Design, 55–60. 
107 Daft , Organization Theory and Design,174–190. 
108 Thompson, Organizations in Action, 50–52. 
In IW, sequential interdependence is relatively incompatible.  Sequential interdependence 
requires the outputs of one entity to become the input of another. Therefore, due to the 
asymmetric nature and complexity of IW, this type would be more suited for traditional tasks 
associated with machine or simple organizations. Daft, Organizational Theory and Design. 
109 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 
http://www.soc.mil/USASOC%20Headquarters/SOF%20Truths.html.   
110 Richard L. Daft, Organization Theory and Design: Tenth Edition, (Mason: South-
Western, Cengage Learning, 2010), 20. 
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indirect approach.  The direct approach focuses on traditional measures of 
effectiveness, such as number of enemy killed or captured.  The indirect 
approach focuses on irregular measures, such as gaining popular support 
enhancing security, and achieving effective governance.  The effectiveness of 
indirect strategies can also be measured via numbers of civilian casualties, 
frequency of insurgent activities, and state/population freedom of maneuver. 
In 2010, the CJSOTF-A, adapted itself to accomplish goals congruent with 
an indirect strategy.  This called for a new hybrid organization.  CJSOTF-A 
effectively integrated two infantry battalions, and augmented them with SOF 
operators. It thus became what Mintzberg might label a professional 
bureaucracy.  The resulting VSTF then employed a number of VSPs throughout 
their assigned AORs to increase presence and expand their spheres of influence.  
VSPs operating under the VSTF hybrid organization proved capable of operating 
in a complex stable environment, and displayed many of the characteristics of a 
professional bureaucracy.  They required an increase in specialized training for 
their operating core.111 At the same time, Special Forces-pure VSPs commanded 
by SOTF commanders most resembled what Mintzberg calls a professional 
adhocracy.  Not uncoincidentally, SOF structures are doctrinally configured to be 
capable of operating in the most complex unstable environments, environments 
not, as it happens, are best suited for professional adhocracies.112  
One reason SOF’s design—along with its personnel—are capable of 
rapid, innovative hybridization is because SOF’s adaptable leaders know how to 
adopt strategies that will produce the desired outcomes and effects in a difficult 
IWE.  This is what they train for.  Doctrinally, the best COIN strategy focuses on 
utilizing local national forces to create security in support of a local/national 
government, allowing it to provide an output that satisfies the people. Previously 
in Afghanistan, the preponderance of GPF forces conducting COIN were 
                                            
111 Mintzberg, Organization Design, 3. 
112 Mintzberg, Organization Design, 103. 
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organized, equipped, and trained to operate in traditional roles to achieve political 
ends militarily.  In contrast, when SOF is placed in the lead, as VSO has recently 
demonstrated, more success is likely to be gained by working toward the same 
political and strategic ends, but in non-traditional, yet ultimately more efficient 
ways.  These nontraditional ways do not just include most IW activities as 
defined by doctrine, but the recent integration of GPF has itself been made 
possible thanks to SOF’s organizational flexibility. 
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VI. INTEGRATION 
With the VSO program as an example and with SOF poised to become 
the lead and supported command in the IWE, it behooves the U.S. military to 
begin to conduct integration activities via training, education, and billeting. Being 
“in the lead” still requires that both SOF and GPF be able to work together as 
seamlessly as possible, one supporting the other.  As humans we build bonds 
and relationships with others through sharing common interests and experiences.  
This is especially true of military members who share in experiences like combat 
and training.   Military training usually involves a process that simulates the 
duties and responsibilities a service member will encounter during the execution 
of his daily tasks in both garrison and combat situations. Incorporating both GPF 
and SOF forces together in training environments should help establish these 
bonds and a common “language” prior to actual combat engagement.  
A. TRAINING 
Strategy in war involves shaping operations that set the conditions 
necessary to accomplish the policy objectives of the National Security apparatus.  
SOF and GPF should begin training together pre-crisis to ensure the best 
possible results during actual engagements.  To build a base level familiarity 
between GPF and SOF units, rotations could be established to integrate GPF 
units with SOF at training sites.  It would take further study to determine the 
correct level(s) at which to conduct this integrated training, but the current 
modular deployment structure of the Army Brigade Combat team suggests it for a 
pilot effort given its inherent self-supporting capability, limiting the need for 
outside support.   
Ideally, there might even be habitual rotations of identified GPF units with 
SOF to foster lasting relations between particular units.  This type of habitual 
rotation could mirror relationships that currently exist between other SOF 
elements. At a minimum, units designated to deploy to an IW environment 
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together should conduct their pre-mission training in an integrated manner to 
ensure that the relationship can begin in a controlled training environment as 
opposed to a “live fire” real-world event. 
 Other synergies are also worth considering. For example, what about 
regional orientations? There are arguments both for and against giving active 
duty units regional responsibilities.  The Army’s current modular force structure 
was established to allow all units to deploy in support of worldwide operations 
interchangeably, and tying them down to one specific region limits the tailorability 
of force package selection by the DoD. In other words, DoD-wide regional 
alignments do not meet the requirements set for flexibility spelled out in the 2010 
National Security Strategy. However, instituting regional alignment similar to the 
SOF regional alignment would help overcome some of the noted capability gaps 
in areas such as language and cultural awareness that often hinder U.S. military 
success.  Another option may be to align National Guard or Reserve units 
regionally, and in parallel with current SOF regional alignments. This may set the 
conditions for Joint and integrated GPF/SOF training on a more permanent basis.  
Of course, the disadvantage is that any training with National Guard or Reserve 
units would be limited at best since most of their personnel train only episodically 
during each fiscal year.  Currently, SEAL Team 8 and 10th SFG(A) are Africa 
oriented, but not restricted to DoD use only in Africa.  Why not similarly consider 
an Africa oriented, but not Africa-only GPF Battalion, for instance? 
B. EDUCATION    
The professional military education (PME) system should adopt a similar 
shaping strategy to set the conditions for successful Joint SOF-GPF operations 
in the IWE.  SOF operators are the subject matter experts in IW operations 
because of their training and experiences. GPF are no less smart or capable, but 
their training regimen does not focus on SOF-specific IW tasks. Nor should it.  In 
recognition that all future wars and conflicts will be engaged in in a joint manner, 
something must be done to ensure that GPF have a base knowledge of SOF and 
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IW operations. This is needed to ensure that GPF commanders and their staffs 
understand how GPF and SOF operations can be complementary.    
 An example of how this might work is the creation of a Special Warfare 
Captain’s Career Course (SWCCC) at the United States Army John F. Kennedy 
Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) that would train Special 
Forces Captain candidates on both SOF-specific planning and the Military 
Decision Making Process (MDMP) in an IW environment.  Officers from other 
branches of the U.S. Army considered integral in Joint and integrated operations 
could be selected to attend this course, thereby exposing them to basic tactical 
and operational level knowledge of IW operations, knowledge that they would be 
able to convey to their GPF commanders during future deployments when SOF 
is integrated with GPF in either the supported or supporting role.  
Officers should be selected from the most likely branches to serve in a 
supporting role during SOF-led IW campaigns, such as the Infantry, Armor, Field 
Artillery, Aviation, and Military Police branches. These branches might be used to 
execute SOF-like, or SOF-advised and assisted missions such as those that are 
underway in Afghanistan with the VSO program.  This course should be 
designed to allow these officers to attend the SWCCC in lieu of their parent 
branch’s course much as cross-flow is already done between courses across 
different Army branches.   The aim should be a thorough understanding of SOF 
support and command and control structures to ensure seamless integration 
during combined operations since fighting IW jointly is the next evolutionary step 
in how the U.S. military is likely to prosecute its wars. Currently there is no 
existing SWCCC. A detailed description of such a course can be found in the 
Appendix.113 
Officers outside of the Maneuver Fires and Effects (MFE)114 branches 
who serve in critical Operational Support (OS)115 and Force Sustainment (FS)116 
                                            
113 See Appendix. 
114 Maneuver Fires and Effects is a management division of the U.S. Army’s Human 
Resource Command that encompasses the forces regarded as having direct effects on the 
enemy through their action. 
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branches, such as Military Intelligence, the Signal Corps, and the Logistics 
branch may be selected to attend a Joint IW Officer’s Familiarization Course 
(JIWOFC). This JIWOFC would complement specific skills gained during the 
CCC by elaborating on the similarities, differences, and nuances to be found in 
Joint IW operations.  These officers should be screened prior to actual selection 
in order to select those who show a proclivity for success in the IWE.  While such 
individuals may not need to exhibit all of the physical traits of SOF operators, 
they should have the correct mental acumen and cultural awareness to ensure 
that they will be able to function well in an IWE.117  
Integration should be undertaken in all phases of PME, not just at the 
company grade officer level. As with training, integration in education prior to real 
world application will be key to successful IW operations when SOF is in the 
lead. Similar programs for joint military education currently exist at NPS, for 
instance, at the field grade officer level through Joint PME (or JPME).  The 
Defense Analysis department’s curriculum focuses on irregular warfare studies at 
the graduate level.  Most officers now attending JPME at NPS are SOF officers 
from all four services, as well as foreign national officers.  Very few GPF officers 
attend this JPME program.  An increase in the number of GPF slots would help 
create SOF-knowledgeable liaisons who can easily integrate back into the GPF 
because that is where they came from.  These officers would be ideal candidates 
for serving as future operations officers and planners responsible for conducting 
most of the operational level planning in an IWE.  In some instances, some of 
these officers will command at that operational level too.   
                                            
115 Operational Support is a management division of the U.S. Army’s Human Resource 
Command that encompasses the personnel branches that provide direct support to the MFE 
branches to conduct their actions towards the enemy. 
116 Force Sustainment is a management division of the U.S. Army’s Human Resource 
Command that encompasses the personnel branches that provide administrative and logistical 
support to the MFE forces. 
117 Regarding essential traits needed and who possesses them in order to conduct effective 
and efficient Irregular Warfare see theses by Brad Burris, ARSOF Professional Military Education 
for the Future. Master’s thesis, June 2010, NPS, and Mike Mourouzis, Finding Lawrence: Finding 
Talent for Unconventional Warfare. Master’s thesis, June 2011, NPS. 
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This kind of integration in education and training could continue upward 
through the War College for O-6s, and beyond. PME integration activities should 
also take place within the Non-Commissioned Officer Education System 
(NCOES) and the Warrant Officer Education System (WOES) to ensure 
integration across the entirety of the force.  Education integration at all levels of 
PME will build relations and a common base of knowledge that will support 
SOF/GPF integration in all environments, not solely IW environments. The most 
important aspect of this integrated education will be establishing a system to 
track exactly who has completed these courses to ensure graduates are 
assigned to the correct duty stations to be utilized as GPF/SOF liaisons.    
With a cadre of GPF officers at all levels who understand how SOF forces 
operate, as well as what they are organized, trained, and equipped to do, 
frictions should dissipate, animosities diminish, or, better yet, cease to exist 
entirely. Also, the choice of the right “tool” for the job will become much clearer to 
all involved.  With the intent of building bridges rather than creating divides 
among DoD forces, more integrated education and training can only lead to more 
interoperability in a Joint irregular or conventional environment, and would short-
circuit the need to overcome the learning curve that exists when trying to master 
areas of subject matter expertise that are already accounted for by another force.  
C. SOF/GPF INTEGRATED BILLETS 
 Typically, liaison positions between SOF and GPF elements are 
established at all levels within a JTF framework after a crisis has happened, and 
the force is deployed to respond.  Given the education and training initiatives just 
described, it would only make sense to establish permanent SOF/GPF liaison 
billets throughout the existing force structure.  LNOs would be integrated whether 
units are permanently assigned to work with one another, a cyclical rotation of 
units is established, or some other hybrid option is adopted as the most effective 
and efficient method to achieve pre-crisis SOF-GPF integration.  
 Special Operations Coordination Cells (SOCC) and General Purpose 
Force Coordination Cells (GPFCC) could likewise be created at the Division and 
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Corps levels to ensure further integration prior to the establishment of a JTF. 
These coordination cells would be able to facilitate training opportunities, 
stimulate joint integration during crisis planning, and deploy with the JTF as an 
immediate SOF/GPF LNO mechanism rather than after deployment, as is 
common today. Establishing/institutionalizing all of these pre-existing 
relationships would not only strengthen bonds between SOF and GPF, but also 
ensure that the JTF would be able to more rapidly establish an effective and 
efficient OODA loop118 cycle, which would position it to stay well ahead of the 
enemy’s actions/reactions as well, which should be the ultimate goal. 
                                            
118 Colonel John Boyd. Observe Orient Decide Act (OODA) is a heuristic developed to allow 
a commander to understand the cyclical nature of the command and control process, the 
capabilities of his people, the role of information (good and bad), and the various ways 




Selecting the right individuals to lead our nation’s forces in combat cannot 
always rely on a conveyor belt “next man up” type of approach. Selecting the 
most effective and efficient leaders requires selecting the correct leader for the 
type of conflict that you are engaged in.119 By selecting the leader trained 
predominantly for the task at hand in the IWE, the U.S. military will eliminate the 
learning curve that has resulted from relying on predominantly GPF 
Commanders in all combat situations. Advocating for SOF to be in the lead is not 
an argument for SOF only in the IWE, but rather the JFC command to work with 
and through the local national forces, partner nations, and the GPF to create a 
synergistic and truly unified approach.   
Organizational design theory asserts that the more complex and unstable 
an environment is the more flexible and adaptable the organization must be to 
frame the problem at hand and formulate a successful/winning strategy.  
“Complex and unstable” could not be better descriptives of the IWE.  SOF is 
doctrinally organized as a professional adhocracy. According to accepted 
organizational design theory that makes it the most effective and efficient force 
for the IWE. 
Some might argue that we can get it right with GPF in the lead, suggesting 
that we did so in Iraq from 2006-2008 during the surge.120 For instance, COL 
Sean MacFarland121 and COL H.R. McMaster122 are described as having 
executed their campaigns during the surge in very unconventional ways, working 
                                            
119 Moyar, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq. 
120 Francis J. West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: 
Random House, 2008). 
121 Steven Clay, Interview with Colonel Sean MacFarland. Contemporary Operations Study 
Team, Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, January 17, 2008. 
122 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military 
Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 (New York: The Penguin Press, 2010), 60. 
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with and through the local nationals. Both are said to have come up with a new 
way to conduct irregular warfare.123 It is important to note that they did not 
engage in these unconventional approaches during their first deployments into 
the Iraqi theater. While it is admirable that they adjusted their tactics over time, it 
appears that there was a learning curve associated with assigning units that were 
not trained for IW to take the lead in an IW theater. Meanwhile, the approaches 
MacFarland and McMaster adopted are not new at all to US Army Special 
Forces, which had been operating in this manner for decades, and in Iraq at least 
since 2004.124  Again, the argument is that if SOF had been placed in the lead 
from the beginning there would not have needed to be such a lengthy discovery-
learning period to figure out this “new” way of war. Instead, this approach could 
have been planned and executed from the outset.  David Kilcullen has stated in 
an interview that it took the United States the historically standard period of time 
(3–4 years) to adapt its strategy in Iraq. He further explains that this is a very 
similar timeline to the U.S. in Vietnam and the British in Malaya, both wars led by 
GPF.125  
In a resource-constrained environment, the United States will not be able 
to afford to waste blood and treasure like we did in Iraq. The learning curve must 
be flattened out to shorten the overall timeline.  Yes, GPF eventually showed 
success in Iraq, but at what cost and for how long?  Arguably, SOF provides a 
much larger return on investment for policy makers by being designed for the 
IWE, which by definition and not just design, makes it the most effective and 
efficient force to take the lead.  
                                            
123 Geroge Packer, “The Lesson of Tal Afar: Is it Too Late for the Administration to Correct 
its Course in Iraq?,” The New Yorker (April 10, 2006). 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/04/10/060410fa_fact2 (Accessed April 1, 1012). 
124 Brent W. Lindeman, “Better Lucky Than Good: A Theory of Unconventional Minds and 
the Power of “Who” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009).  
125 Carlos Lozada, “A Conversation with David Kilcullen,” The Washington Post, March 22, 
2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2009/03/19/AR2009031903038.html 
(Accessed April 1, 2012).  
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The IWE presents tremendous challenges to the U.S. military as 
evidenced by the last 10 years of war in Afghanistan.  SOF continually 
demonstrate their ability to operate in the complex and unstable IWE as proven 
by their development and execution of VSO that has consequently become the 
main effort of ISAF.  Because SOF are uniquely suited to develop the 
unconventional solutions required for success in the IWE, they were able to 
create what former COMISAF, GEN Petraeus, deemed the potential “game 
changer” in Afghanistan, VSO.  SOF thereby solidified the United States’ 
chances for at least tactical and operational success in Afghanistan.   
GPF and SOF can support each other in both traditional and irregular 
ways when required. SOF will continue to support GPF in conventional warfare. 
Building upon the success of the VSO program, we may have the blueprint for 
future GPF/SOF integration in future large scale IW conflicts when we identify the 
IWE, and place IW thinkers in command from the outset.  But this must be clearly 
defined in Joint IW doctrine as well as be laid out in future Quadrennial Defense 
Review preparations to ensure the United States does not find itself behind the 
power curve in future IW conflicts.  
IW doctrine, still in its infancy, has a long way to go before it can take its 
place alongside better established and more mature doctrine.  At the same time, 
as the war in Afghanistan wanes, and new economic and political realities intrude 
or compete for attention, progress in IW transformation will continue to require 
new and innovative solutions.  SOF, as the lead for IW, would be well served by 
thinking hard with GPF about how to best integrate capabilities and personnel for 
IW environments.   In keeping with SOF traditions, this would have the ultimate 
force multiplier effect.  
By having a framework for selecting the correct forces and commanders 
for each type of environment, legislators can be sure to make the best use of 
critical resources.  Once this is clearly defined in doctrine and, more importantly, 
directed by policy makers, the animosities, questions of campaign design, and 
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other stumbling blocks will be removed; the most effective and efficient strategy 
can then be selected.  The nation’s resources are limited, and becoming more 
limited almost daily.  Getting the selection of who commands in the IWE right is 
critical to preserve both blood and treasure while moving forward towards 
success in future irregular conflicts. 
Questions remain as to whether the current personnel management 
systems of the U.S. military can resource the needs of a SOF JFC.  Further 
research is necessary to determine how to fill these command billets, and may 
also point to separate or at least vastly adjusted SOF Human Resource 
Management (HRM).  Should each Service maintain control over its respective 
SOF HRM?  Should SOCOM have greater control over SOF HRM?  Is there 
some meet-in-the-middle solution that would work? These questions and many 
more will have to be answered.  They may even necessitate another sweeping 
legislative reform such as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 




To fully understand how and why creation of a SWCCC might be the 
preferred choice for training IW-oriented Captains, it is important to understand 
how the system currently works, where it is flawed, and how this proposed fix 
would benefit SOF. Not only would it be a more effective and efficient way to 
create IW thinkers in SOF, but would create a cadre of IW liaisons within GPF 
force structures.  
One might think that overseas contingency operations deployments would 
be keeping the Special Forces Qualification Course from meeting requirements 
for Special Forces Captains. But, in fact, the large bottleneck is a backlog of 
officers from multiple branches at the Maneuver Captains Career Course 
(MCCC) at Fort Benning, GA. Officers from the Infantry, Armor, and Special 
Forces branches are required to complete this level of professional military 
education, and at times officers from other branches in the Army, as well as 
foreign national officers, also obtain seats in the limited capacity courses.  These 
officers are selected to ensure that integration takes place, leading to success in 
the combined arms construct of land air battle doctrine that drives how DoD 
prosecutes war in a conventional environment. 
 An Army officer can apply for consideration to become a Special Forces 
Captain and detachment commander as soon as he becomes promotable to the 
rank of Captain, and is in the cohort year group (YG) to be considered by the 
ARSOF board.  If he meets the requirements his packet will be accepted for 
consideration by this board.  If selected by the board the officer must attend a 
nineteen day Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) to determine 
where he should be allowed to continue training in what is referred to at 
USAJFKSWCS, and among Green Berets, as the “SF Pipeline.”  The pipeline 
encompasses all phases of the process of molding a Green Beret, from the 
ARSOF board until his arrival at his first Special Forces assignment.  
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Once selected at SFAS, an SF training pipeline officer candidate must 
attend the MCCC before he continues with training in the SFQC at Ft. Bragg.  
The MCCC is designed to train Infantry and Armor branch Captains to be 
company commanders.  Since the SFODA is designed to train, advise, and 
assist up to a battalion of indigenous force soldiers in the execution of small unit 
tactics, it has been determined that this course offers the best basis for gaining 
the knowledge about how to plan and execute operations up to the brigade level. 
The MCCC is a six month long course, and due to the fact that it is located at Ft. 
Benning, GA, requires a permanent change of station (PCS) move on either end 
to get the Special Forces Captain candidate CCC qualified by Army standards.  
Altogether the process requires eight months total the PCS moves are taken into 
consideration.   
The remainder of the SFQC is broken down into six phases as listed in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   Special Forces Qualification Course Phases 126 
The average length of time it currently takes a Captain SF candidate to 
complete the SF training pipeline is 29 months. It is important to note that this is 
the average, meaning some candidates take much longer to complete the 
                                            
126 USAJFKSWCS graphic representation of SF Training Pipeline, current as of September 
2010. 
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pipeline training, while others take less time.  The USAJFKSWCS goal to meet 
demands by the SF Groups for SFODA commanders is 20 months.   
The first period of lag time in training is between the ARSOF board and 
attendance at SFAS.  This is due in part to deployment schedules and class size, 
but is manageable by enforcing the rule of requiring ARSOF candidates to attend 
SFAS within 12 months of the AROSF board releasing results to each cohort YG.  
The next and largest gap in training is the lag between SFAS and attendance of 
the MCCC.  The Infantry and Armor proponencies “own” that school house, and 
also have a backlog of their own students thanks to brigade and battalion 
commanders keeping officers for combat rotations. SF Branch highlights the 
need for expedited attendance to these courses on their website.  
Captains now pin on Major at nine years of Active Federal 
Commissioned Service. In order to complete the Special Forces 
Training Pipeline and complete the required twenty-four months of 
Detachment Command in order to fulfill the Key and Developmental 
requirement prior to the officer’s Primary Zone consideration for 
promotion to Major, ARSOF Candidates must attend the Special 
Forces Assessment and Selection Course, and the Maneuver 
Captains Career Course at the first available opportunity following 
the ARSOF Board127 
In order to meet promotion requirements established in DA Pam 600–3 these 
officers cannot afford to have delays as long as they currently are.  This fact is 
illustrated in a Figure 2, and the preferred timeline is represented in Figure 3. 
                                            
127 Retrieved from SF Branch Captains assignments link March 10, 2011: 
https://www.hrcapps.army.mil/site/protect/branches/officer/MFE/SpecialForces/Accessions-and-
Training.htm   
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Figure 2.    Year Group 2005 SF Training Pipeline Average Timeline. 
 
Figure 3.   Year Group 2007 SF Training Pipeline Not Later Than Dates 128 
These Figures use Cohort YG 2005 because the majority of SF Training 
Pipeline Captains due to graduate in fiscal year (FY) 2011 are from this cohort 
                                            
128 SF Branch graphic representations of current and desired SF CPT Training Pipeline 
timelines, current as of September 2010. 
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YG.  As of September 2010 there were 302 total officers enrolled in the SF 
Captain Training Pipeline, 250 of whom had passed SFAS, and 144 of whom 
have graduated from the MCCC.  The estimated time between the cohort YG 
2007 officers ARSOF board results release and SFAS is nine months.  The 
estimated time between SFAS and the MCCC is ten months.  USASOC has 51 
slots per MCCC class [46 for SF officer candidates, and 5 for Military Information 
Support Operations (MISO) and Civil Affairs (CA) officer candidates also selected 
by the ARSOF Board].  The U.S. Army Infantry School conducts six MCCC 
classes per FY.  The average number of SF officer candidates who graduate the 
MCCC on time per year is 306.  Due to the MCCC constraints from past years, 
the SF training Pipeline still has cohort YGs ’04 and ’05 officer candidates who 
need to attend, or are currently enrolled in the MCCC.  Recent requirements for 
Infantry and Armor officers have prevented the ARSOF from receiving all 51 of its 
slots. This has created a backlog of approximately 35 SF officer candidates from 
cohort YG ’06, which is the equivalent of two SF battalions worth of SFODA 
commanders.129 The current status of each cohort YG’s planned officer 
candidate attendance under the 51 slot model is depicted in Figure 4. 
  
                                            
129 SF Branch presentation to Commander USAJFKSWCS concerning the backlog of the SF 
Captains Training Pipeline, current as of September 2010. 
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Special Forces Candidates Currently Scheduled for Future MCCC 
• Year Group 2004:  1 candidate 
• Year Group 2005:  34 candidates 
• Year Group 2006:  273 candidates   
Current MCCC Attendance Plan For Year Groups 2004, 2005, and 2006 (51 
Slot Model) 
• MCCC Class 10–001 (Fort Benning):  47 students (under planning quota 
by 1) (Class 10–001 quota:  48) 
• MCCC Class 10–002 (Fort Knox):  15 students (under planning quota by 
1)  
• MCCC Class 10–002 (Fort Benning):  48 students (under planning quota 
by 3)  
• MCCC Class 10–003 (Fort Knox):  17 students (exceeded quota by 1) 
• MCCC Class 10–004 (Fort Knox):  16 students (met planning quota)  
• MCCC Class 10–003 (Fort Benning):  51 students (met planning quota)  
• MCCC Class 10–004 (Fort Benning):  51 students (met planning quota)  
• MCCC Class 11–001 (Fort Benning): 51 students (met planning quota) 
• MCCC Class 11–002 (Fort Benning):  12 students (quota will be met with 
Year Group 2007 officers)    
Figure 4.   Year Group 2004–2006 MCCC Attendance Plan130 
The significance of this Figure is that if the SF training pipeline candidates 
were provided with 51 seats per MCCC class, cohort YGs ’04–’06 would be 
MCCC-qualified by June 2011.  Cohort YG ’07 candidates would not be able to 
attend an MCCC class until January 2011. That class begins nine months after 
the FY 2010 ARSOF board released its results.  This will be future compounded 
with the ensuing FY 2011 board and its group of SF training pipeline candidates.  
The FY 2010 candidates would be MCCC qualified by February 2012, again 
                                            
130 SF Branch presentation to Commander USAJFKSWCS, September 2010. 
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assuming SF Branch is able to secure the 51 seats for each class, and also 
assuming that the historically predictable number of 200 candidates will not begin 
until 22 months after the release of their ARSOF board results.  This would 
create an average of 27 months’ time from ARSOF board to his first Group 
assignment for cohort YG ’09–’12. But again, the SF Branch has not been able to 
secure the full 51 seats in well over three years.131 
While there are some internal fixes that SF Branch, the USAJFKSWCS, 
and the Directorate of Special Operations Proponency (DSOP) can make to 
reduce this lag time, these fixes would only amount to band aids, and future 
backlogs will recur whenever the Infantry and Armor branches need to surge 
their officers through the MCCC to meet their own requirements.  This cannot be 
held against them as they have mission requirements in support of Overseas 
Contingency Operations, and must stay poised to support any further worldwide 
crisis response, just like the SF Regiment.  It is also their school.  
SF Branch does contribute SF Majors to serve as small group instructors 
for the MCCC in exchange for the slots received, and it has offered more 
instructors to try and increase the total class capacity.  However, the U.S. Army 
Infantry School does not have the physical space or logistical capacity to 
increase beyond its current student load now, or in the near future.  With 
increasing budget cuts to the Department of Defense, it may even have to scale 
back.  One long term fix would be the creation of a SWCCC to accomplish the 
goal of creating enough seats to meet the SF Regiment’s SF captain 
requirements, and train a cadre of SOF liaisons within the GPF force structure to 
ensure seamless integration in both irregular and conventional environments.  
This would simultaneously reduce overall budget requirements for the Army due 
to the fact that SF training pipeline candidates would reduce their total number of 
PCS moves from three to two, and in some cases no PCS would be required at 
all. Currently an officer must PCS to Ft. Benning for the MCCC, graduate from 
the MCCC, and then PCS to Ft. Bragg, NC for the SFQC.  Upon graduation from 
                                            
131 SF Branch presentation to Commander USAJFKSWCS, September 2010. 
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the SFQC he must then PCS onward to his first SF assignment.  The costs of 
this add up, especially when one considers the shipment of household goods, 
travel and lodging for the officer and his family, as well as per diem and MALT 
expenses. Even more important is the time lost. Each PCS can amount to as 
much as thirty days when the officer is neither training nor serving in an SF 
Captain assignment. In a best case scenario, for an officer stationed at Ft. Bragg, 
NC in a unit such as the 82nd Airborne Division, or one of the many other units 
located there, with a follow-on assignment with the 3rd Special Forces Group 
(also located at Ft. Bragg), no PCS would be required. Ultimately that would save 
the Army as much as $75,000–$100,000 per officer, and recoup as much as 
120 days’ lost time.  
SWCCC would also enable DSOP to meet the Army requirement of 
producing CCC-qualified captains for the SFQC and SF Groups while 
simultaneously eliminating the ten months of lag time that currently exists for SF 
training pipeline candidates prior to the MCCC. SWCCC would focus on SF 
Captain-specific issues, concerns, and training needs, rather than relying on the 
“best fit we can find” from the MCCC. Additionally, this will return the two SF 
Majors used as instructors at the MCCC to the SF Regiment to meet other 
assignment requirements currently not being filled, while also restoring the 
Infantry and Armor branches their full MCCC class capacity for their full utilization 
DoD believes it needs more SFODAs to meet the requirements for 
competent SOF worldwide.  The SF Regiment does not currently have the ability 
to provide a commander for each of its SFODAs due to the expansion of the 
force, and the bottlenecks associated with both getting a SF training pipeline 
candidate to SFAS and through the MCCC to begin the SFQC.  Close 
examination of these bottlenecks and gaps reveals that the current system will 
never be able to create enough supply to meet that demand.  In order to fix this 
issue, and be able to maintain the proper rate of production over an extended 
period of time, SF should redress this in-house.  An organization is better served 
with a solution over which they have ownership.  Creation of a SWCCC may in 
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fact be the answer to owning the solution; it would break these log jams, and 
allow the SFQC to produce enough SF training pipeline candidates to supply the 
SF Groups’ demand for competent Captains to command their SFODAs.   
Further research into the program of instruction at the MCCC conducted 
by the U.S. Army Infantry School is required to ensure that the SWCCC meets 
the Army’s requirements for CCC qualification under the policies and regulations 
set by Training and Doctrine Command.  SWCCC should be co-located with 
DSOP and USAJFKSWCS at Ft. Bragg.  SWCCC should also offer a 
complement of seats to GPF, as suggested within Chapter V, to meet the 
requirement to create GPF/SOF liaisons.  GPF officers not further assigned to 
Ft. Bragg would still be required to PCS to their next assignments, just as they 
would from MCCC or other CCCs. 
Given the U.S. deficit and the impending cuts in the DoD, DSOP cannot 
expect growth in class size or logistical capacity of the MCCC at Ft. Benning, GA.  
The USAJFKSWCS should therefore utilize its own space, and present a plan 
that shows how it can help reduce expenditures by reducing the number of PCS 
moves Captain candidates make.  Using existing classroom space that belongs 
to the SOAF 18A MOS committee, along with its associated instructors would 
also minimize any incurred costs, while further shortening the overall training 
timeline.   
By having SWCCC own the SF Regiment’s course, and focus on IW 
leadership needs at the Captain level, it would not just meet the need of 
providing future SFODA commanders more expeditiously, but would create a 
cadre of IW liaisons who will know how to help SOF integrate GPF when SOF is 
the supported command in the IWE. 
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